

RUNNING HEAD: Value Violations and Prejudice toward Muslims

IN PRESS, GROUP PROCESSES AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS

Gender Equality, Value Violations, and Prejudice Toward Muslims

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Abstract

Why are people prejudiced toward Muslims? In this research, we used a value violation framework to predict that when people believe Muslims value gender equality less than reference groups, it creates a value violation that leads to prejudice. In Study 1, people believed that Muslims value gender equality less than Christians, and the more people believed that Muslims do not value gender equality the more they reported prejudice toward Muslims. In Study 2, we manipulated perceptions of how much Muslims value gender equality by giving people evidence that Muslims either do or do not support women's rights. Afterward, we measured people's prejudice toward Muslims and desire for social distance. Telling people that Muslims value gender equality reduced both prejudice and the desire for social distance. These effects occurred by increasing people's beliefs that they share values with Muslims, highlighting the importance of values as a source of prejudice.

Key words: prejudice, Muslims, values, value violation, gender equality

Gender Equality, Value Violations, and Prejudice Toward Muslims

How much do Muslims value gender equality? Not much? Quite a bit? According to the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, the answer may be both. Opinion polls show that there are important differences among the world's 1.6 billion Muslims in support for women's rights. In a 2010 poll, for example, Pew found almost universal support in several countries around the world for the belief that men and women should have equal rights, including in a few predominantly Muslim countries like Turkey and Lebanon. At the same time, however, of the six countries where less than 80% of the population agreed that men and women should have equal rights, five were predominantly Muslim (Pew Research Center, 2010). How do differences in values, support for gender equality, and the rights of women in various cultures affect people's prejudice toward Muslims? In this paper, we propose a simple hypothesis. Using a value violation framework, we suggest that when people believe that Muslims value gender equality less than reference groups, they will report prejudice toward Muslims.

Prejudice toward Muslims

Why are people in the U.S. prejudiced toward Muslims? Beyond a few well-established reasons why people hold prejudice toward any outgroup—social identity concerns, realistic and symbolic conflict, representation of minority groups within a culture—we believe there are three specific and salient explanations for prejudice toward Muslims. First, terrorism and stereotypes linking Islam and Muslims with terrorism are clear sources of prejudice. Consistent with a sociofunctional approach to prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) and intergroup theories of threat and conflict, reminders of terrorism increase prejudice toward Muslims, especially among people with conservative beliefs and authoritarian traits (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, &

Vermeulen, 2009; Ogan, Willnat, Pennington, & Bashir, 2013; Oswald, 2005; Steel, Parker, Lickel, 2014). In addition, hate crimes against Muslims increase after terrorist attacks (Soltas & Stephens-Davidowitz, 2015; Lichtblau, 2015). Thus, there is strong evidence that fears of terrorism cause prejudice toward Muslims.

A second reason people might be prejudiced toward Muslims is immigration. Immigration reliably elicits prejudice from majority groups toward immigrant groups when it forces competition over scarce resources or symbolic aspects of culture (Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005). At times, these conflicts become national news stories such as when a Tyson Foods plant accommodated its Muslim employees by replacing Labor Day as a paid holiday with the festival of Eid al-Fitr (Greenhouse, 2008) or when a group of developers proposed building a Muslim community center near the former World Trade Center towers (Barbaro, 2010). When these types of conflict occur, prejudice may follow.

Finally, a third and perhaps less appreciated source of prejudice might be perceived differences in support for gender equality. Although women face sexism in the U.S. and other Western countries, there is a trend toward gender equality and few people want to deny women legal rights. In fact, a representative survey of U.S. citizens found that 97% believe women and men should have equal rights (Pew Research Center, 2010). In contrast, while gender equality is supported in some Muslim countries, in others, large portions of the population favor restricting women's rights to divorce, to inherit equal property with male siblings, to compete with men for jobs, to pursue a university education, to disobey a husband, and to choose whether or not to wear a veil (Pew Research Center, 2010; 2013). Because these rights are universally supported in the U.S., we suspect that a lack of support for women's rights in some Muslims countries may contribute to a general belief that Muslims do not value gender equality. And, we argue, this

belief may lead to prejudice toward Muslims.

Value Violations and Prejudice

Values are integral to prejudice—something social psychologists have recognized since the start of the field. Allport (1954), for example, famously described how people's values could lead them to reject others who do not share those values, and since then, values have remained central to several theories of prejudice. Common in many of these theories is the hypothesis that individualism, hard work, and self-reliance promote prejudice while egalitarianism inhibits prejudice (see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003 for a review).

Most of the evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from research investigating Whites' prejudice toward Blacks (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Katz & Hass, 1988; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976). According to two prominent theories—symbolic and modern racism—White people express prejudice toward Black people because Blacks are perceived to violate traditional American values such as hard work (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears & Henry, 2003). Consistent with this idea, Whites who score high on measures of traditional values tend to oppose Black political candidates and policies that aid Black people (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman, 1997; although see Bobo, 1983; Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992). Furthermore, priming Whites with hard work and other values related to the Protestant work ethic increases prejudice toward Blacks (Katz & Hass, 1988). In contrast, egalitarian values prescribe tolerance and are negatively associated with prejudice toward Blacks and other minorities (Katz & Hass, 1988; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).

Although research generally supports the hypothesis that hard work and individualism

promote prejudice and that egalitarianism inhibits it, two more recent research findings challenge this idea. First, traditional values alone do not seem to create prejudice. Even though people with traditional values are often prejudiced toward several different groups, prejudice is not directed at all groups for the same reason (Biernat & Vescio, 2005; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Instead, personal values cause prejudice when stereotypes connect specific groups to violations of specific values (Biernat & Vescio, 2005; Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996). Thus, people express more prejudice toward a lazy Black person than a lazy gay person because stereotypes of Blacks suggest they do not value hard work (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996). Similarly, people express prejudice toward a gay man who is a bad father but not a heterosexual man described the same way because stereotypes of gay men suggest they do not hold strong family values (Vescio & Biernat, 2003). In other words, prejudice occurs when stereotypes suggest that a specific group violates a specific value.

Second, in contrast to the view that egalitarianism inhibits prejudice, recent research suggests egalitarianism may actually *promote* prejudice toward some groups. Traditionally, psychologists have restricted the study of prejudice to people's feelings toward low status and stigmatized groups. These studies have found that conservatives often express more prejudice towards low status groups than liberals do (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014; Chambers, Schlenker, Collisson, 2013; Crandall, Ferguson, & Bahns, 2013). But recent research identifies several groups (e.g., men, Whites, elderly people, and fundamentalist Christians) that liberals express more prejudice towards than conservatives (Chambers et al., 2012). Essential to explaining these differences in prejudice are differences in the values that liberals and conservatives tend to hold (Brandt et al., 2014). While liberals value equality, cultural pluralism, and respect for individual liberty, conservatives value equity, the status quo,

and respect for authority and traditions (Chambers et al., 2012; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). These opposing values lead liberals and conservatives to express prejudice toward groups they perceive as violating their values, and the existence of this prejudice across the political spectrum is strong evidence that prejudice occurs when stereotypes about a group conflict with personal values.

Here, we apply value violations to the issue of gender equality, making three predictions about the connection between people's beliefs about gender equality and prejudice toward Muslims. First, we predicted that people would believe Muslims value gender equality less than other religious groups. This prediction is based on representative opinion polls that suggest there are some important differences in support for women's rights across cultures (Pew Research Center, 2010) and that people in the U.S. do not believe Muslims respect women (Pew Research Center, 2006). As a result, we expected people to report that Muslims value gender equality less than reference groups. In contrast, because Muslims are not stereotyped as lazy (Sides & Gross, 2013) we did not expect people to report that Muslims violate other traditional American values like hard work. We chose hard work as a comparison value because past research has focused on how the Protestant work ethic promotes prejudice towards many different groups that are stereotyped as lazy, including Blacks (Biernat et al., 1996), fat people (Crandall, 1994), poor people (Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001), and Latinos (Kluegel, 1990). Thus, we argue that the situation of Muslims in the U.S. may be unique when compared to other groups because people are more likely to perceive Muslims as violating the value of gender equality than the value of hard work.

Second, we predicted that people's beliefs about how much Muslims value gender equality would be associated with prejudice. Because people in the U.S. generally believe

women should have equal rights with men (Pew Research Center, 2010), perceiving that Muslims violate gender equality should lead to prejudice. Consistent with this idea, women express more prejudice toward Muslims when their identity as a woman is salient than when an identity not relevant to stereotypes about Muslims is salient (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012). Alternatively, because Muslims in the U.S. are not stereotyped as violating values like hard work, we did not expect people's beliefs about hard work to be associated with prejudice.

Finally, we predicted that if people's beliefs about gender equality are tied to prejudice, then increasing beliefs that Muslims value gender equality should decrease prejudice. This hypothesis offers a direct test of the idea that prejudice occurs when people believe that a group violates an important value (Biernat & Vescio, 2005). We tested our three predictions in two studies reported below.

Study 1

In Study 1, we asked adults in the U.S. how much Muslims value gender equality and hard work. We compared these responses with how much people believed that Christians care about these values, and we measured people's prejudice toward Muslims. While we expected people to believe that Muslims value gender equality less than Christians, we expected no difference in how much people believed the two groups value hard work. As a reminder, we chose to compare the value of gender equality with the value of hard work because many stigmatized group in the U.S. are perceived as violating the value of hard work (O'Brien & Gilbert, 2013). Second, we expected that the more people believed Muslims do not value gender equality, the more likely they would be to report prejudice toward Muslims. We did not expect people's beliefs about how much Muslims value hard work to be associated with prejudice.

Method

Participants and procedure. One hundred thirty-six adults—88 women, 47 men—from the U.S. completed the study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for 50¢. The sample was primarily White (79%), older than most college samples (M age = 32.00 years, SD = 11.59), slightly liberal (M = 6.01, SD = 2.00, on a scale where 1 = *very conservative* and 9 = *very liberal*), and well educated; eighty-seven percent of people reported at least some college education and 50% reported at least an associate’s degree. Our sample was also politically and religiously diverse. Thirty-five percent of people identified as Democrats, 39% as Independents, 8% as Libertarians, and 13% as Republicans. The remaining 5% identified with other parties or no party at all. Thirty-eight percent of the sample identified as Atheist or Agnostic, 27% as Protestant, 16% as Catholic, 4% as Jewish, and less than 1% identified with other religions (14% of people did not answer).

After providing consent, people reported how much they believed Muslims and Christians value gender equality and hard work. Then, people answered questions measuring prejudice toward Muslims before finally answering demographic questions and receiving debriefing information. We collected data from as many participants as we could with the funds available for this project. Although we did not conduct a power analysis beforehand, a posthoc power analysis showed that our power to detect an interaction between religious group (Muslim vs. Christian) and value (gender equality vs. hard work) was 99%.

Measures

Group values: gender equality and hard work. We measured people’s beliefs about each groups’ values by asking how much Muslims and Christians support, oppose, value,

disagree with, and violate gender equality; then, we asked the same questions for hard work (adapted from Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996). People provided their responses using a 7-point scale (0 = *Not at all*, 6 = *Very much*). We reverse-scored items where appropriate, then averaged the items measuring gender equality and hard work for Muslims and Christians separately (α 's for gender equality > .86; α 's for hard work > .83).

Prejudice toward Muslims. We measured prejudice toward Muslims with 30 items from the Anti-Muslim Prejudice Scale (Ernst, Bornstein, & Venable, 2003) and the Islamophobia Scale (Lee, Gibbons, Thompson, & Timani, 2009). Using a 7-point scale (0 = *Strongly agree*, 6 = *Strongly disagree*), people responded to items like, "Compared with other people, Muslims are uncivilized and backward," "I would support any policy that would stop the building of new mosques (Muslim places of worship) in the U.S.," and "Muslims show great respect for human rights and freedom." We reverse-scored items where appropriate and because the scales were highly reliable (α 's > .91) and strongly correlated ($r = .74, p < .001$), we averaged them into one measure of prejudice.

Results

Group Values: gender equality and hard work. To test whether people believed there are differences in how much Muslims and Christians value gender equality and hard work, we conducted a 2 (Group: Muslim vs. Christian) x 2 (Value: Gender Equality vs. Hard Work) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).

Overall, people believed that both groups value hard work more than gender equality, $F(1, 133) = 330.70, p < .001$, and people generally believed that Muslims have weaker values than Christians, $F(1, 133) = 116.29, p < .001$. More importantly, the predicted interaction was

significant, $F(1, 133) = 120.76, p < .001$ (see Figure 1). As expected, people believed that Muslims value gender equality less than Christians, $F(1, 133) = 158.84, p < .001, d = 1.52$, but there was little difference in how much people believed that Muslims and Christians value hard work, $F(1, 133) = 2.83, p = .10, d = 0.13$ (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics).

Prejudice toward Muslims. We regressed prejudice onto people's beliefs about how much Muslims value gender equality and hard work. The overall regression equation was significant, $R^2 = .15, F(2, 131) = 11.54, p < .001$. While we only expected beliefs about gender equality to predict prejudice, the results indicated that people's beliefs about both gender equality ($\beta = -.29, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.55, -.16], p < .001$) and hard work ($\beta = -.30, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.60, -.18], p < .001$) predicted prejudice toward Muslims.

Discussion

Overall, the findings from Study 1 supported our hypotheses. People believed that Muslims value gender equality less than Christians, and the more that people believed Muslims do not value gender equality the more prejudice they reported toward Muslims. Also consistent with our hypotheses, people reported little difference in how much Muslims and Christians value hard work. This means that unlike many stigmatized groups in the U.S., there does not appear to be a widespread belief that Muslims violate the value of hard work. However, among people who believed that Muslims violate hard work, we found more prejudice. While we did not predict this finding, it is, in retrospect, consistent with a value violation framework. That is, even though few people perceive Muslims as violating the value of hard work overall, according to the theory, those people who believe that Muslims violate the value of hard work should also be relatively higher in prejudice.

The primary limitation of Study 1 is that it does not show a causal relationship between value violations and prejudice. Thus, in Study 2, we manipulated Muslims' support for gender equality and measured people's prejudice. We decided to focus on the value of gender equality because the results of Study 1 suggested that gender equality is a unique aspect of people's attitudes toward Muslims and something that may differentiate prejudice toward Muslims from prejudice toward other stigmatized groups in the U.S.

Study 2

In Study 2, we experimentally tested whether increasing people's beliefs that Muslims support gender equality reduces prejudice. We manipulated support for gender equality by giving participants a fake article reporting the results of a nationally representative poll comparing support for women's rights among religious groups in the U.S. In the no value violation condition, the poll suggested that Christians, Jews, and Muslims all support women's rights at roughly the same rate. In the value violation condition, the poll suggested that Muslims support women's rights significantly less than Christians and Jews. Consequently, in the value violation condition the information was consistent with what many Americans, including those in our Study 1 sample, believe is true: that Muslims do not value gender equality. Meanwhile the information in the no violation condition was intended to increase people's beliefs that Muslims support gender equality. We chose Christians and Jews as comparison groups because they are the largest religious groups in the U.S. (Pew Research Center, 2015).

Finally, we tried to improve our measures in three ways. First, to better test our argument about values and prejudice, we measured people's beliefs that they share common values with Muslims. Second, as an additional measure of prejudice, we assessed people's desire for social

distance from Muslims. Third, to improve our measure of prejudice, we included items from the Anti-Arab Prejudice Scale, which includes questions that refer to both Muslims and Arabs (Echebarria-Echabe & Guede, 2007). Although these two groups are distinct, they are often treated in the U.S. as if they are the same group. Thus, we decided to test whether our manipulation reduces prejudice toward both groups.

Method

Participants and procedure. One hundred ninety-one psychology students—116 women, 71 men—completed the study for partial course credit. The sample was primarily White (81%), young (M age = 19.11 years, SD = 1.62), slightly liberal (M = 5.80, SD = 1.82, on a scale where 1 = *very conservative* and 9 = *very liberal*), and politically and religiously diverse. Forty-six percent of people identified as Democrats, 22% as Independents, 22% as Republicans, and the remaining 10% identified with other parties or no party at all. For religious affiliation, 33% of people identified as Jewish, 26% as Atheist or Agnostic, 21% as Catholic, 10% as Protestant, and 8% identified with other religions.

When students arrived at the lab, an experimenter obtained consent, randomly assigned them to one of two conditions, and told them we were interested in testing a new way of teaching people about statistics. Then, the experimenter gave a short tutorial on understanding statistically significant differences between groups. After the tutorial, the experimenter asked students to read the article manipulation and complete a worksheet with questions about the statistical information in the article. The worksheet reinforced the cover story and ensured that students understood the information in the article. After students completed the worksheet, the experimenter asked them to answer some questions measuring their beliefs about the values of

religious groups and their overall attitudes toward different groups. Following the dependent measures, students answered demographic questions before they were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

We began data collection at the start of the semester and collected data from as many participants as we could before the semester ended. Although we did not conduct an a priori power analysis, we conducted a posthoc power analysis for a multivariate effect of the manipulation on all dependent measures. This analysis revealed that our observed power was 81%.

Materials

We told students the article they read was from *The New York Times* and that it reported the results of a nationally representative poll measuring support for women's rights across the largest religious groups in the U.S. We presented each group's support for women's rights as the percent of respondents who agreed with the statement, "Women should have equal rights with men." We chose this question because it was easy to comprehend and because it was the question that Pew asked in a 2010 survey that found 97% of Americans agree women should have equal rights with men.

The articles students read were identical except for the description of how much Muslims support women's rights. In the no violation condition, the article stated that Christians, Jews, and Muslims all agreed that women should have equal rights with men. A graph depicted each groups' support—Christians (97%), Jews (95%), Muslims (96%). In the value violation condition, the article stated that Muslims support women's rights less than other religious

groups. Similar to the no violation condition, a graph depicted each groups' support¹—Christians (97%), Jews (95%), Muslims (62%). The difference between Muslims and the other groups was described as “statistically significant.”

Measures

Manipulation Check. Students reported how much Muslims, Christians, and Jews value and oppose gender equality (adapted from Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996) on a 7-point scale (0 = *Not at all*, 6 = *Very much*). We reverse scored opposition to gender equality and averaged the items for each group (Christians, $r = .70, p < .001$; Jews, $r = .59, p < .001$; Muslims, $r = .87, p < .001$).

Prejudice toward Muslims and Arabs. We measured prejudice with 20 items adapted from the Anti-Muslim Prejudice Scale (Ernst, Venable, & Bornstein, 2003) and the Anti-Arab Attitudes Scale (Echebarria-Echabe & Guede, 2007). Using a 7-point scale (0 = *Strongly disagree*, 6 = *Strongly agree*), students responded to items like, “Islam is radical and intolerant,” “Muslims cherish every human life,” and “Arabs are a threat to America.”

Because some items from the Anti-Arab Attitudes Scale referred to Muslims and some to Arabs, we combined the items referring to Muslims with questions from the Anti-Muslim Prejudice Scale, creating one measure of prejudice toward Muslims and one measure of prejudice toward Arabs. We reverse-scored items where appropriate, then averaged the 13 items referring to Muslims and the seven items referring to Arabs (Prejudice toward Muslims, $\alpha = .92$;

¹ We placed Muslims' support for women's rights at 62% in the value violation condition because this represents actual support for women's rights in several countries surveyed by Pew in 2010. For the seven predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, support for women's rights ranged from 45% - 95%. From lowest to highest: Nigeria (45%), Egypt (60%), Jordan (61%), Indonesia (64%), Pakistan (79%), Turkey (89%), and Lebanon (95%).

Prejudice toward Arabs, $\alpha = .86$). The two measures were highly correlated, $r = .83, p < .001$, suggesting that participants did not differentiate much between Muslims and Arabs.

Social Distance. Students reported their desire for social distance with 11 items adapted from Bogardus (1923) and Crandall (1991). Using a 7-point scale (0 = *Strongly disagree*, 6 = *Strongly agree*), students answered questions like, “I try to keep my distance from Muslims,” and “I feel comfortable with Muslims immigrating to this country.” We reverse-scored items where appropriate, then averaged all items into a highly reliable measure of social distance ($\alpha = .94$).

Shared Values. In addition to measuring prejudice, we measured how much students believed they share values with Muslims. Using a 7-point scale (0 = *Strongly agree*, 6 = *Strongly disagree*), students answered the items, “Muslims hold values that conflict with my own personal values,” and “The values of Muslims threaten the American way of life.” The items were adequately correlated ($r = .54, p = .001$), so we averaged them together. Higher scores indicate greater disagreement and thus stronger beliefs about shared values.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation Check. Students who read that Muslims support women’s rights reported stronger beliefs that Muslims value gender equality than students who read that Muslims do not support women’s rights, $F(1, 189) = 46.08, p < .001, d = 0.98$ (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). Additional ANOVA’s indicated that the manipulation did not affect how much students believed that Christians ($M_{\text{Overall}} = 4.68$) or Jews ($M_{\text{Overall}} = 4.76$) valued gender equality, F ’s $< 1.01, p$ ’s $> .32$.

Prejudice toward Muslims and Arabs

Students who read that Muslims support women's rights reported less prejudice toward Muslims than students who read that Muslims do not support women's rights, $F(1,189) = 10.93$, $p = .001$, $d = 0.48$ (see Figure 2). Similarly, students who read that Muslims support women's rights reported less prejudice toward Arabs than students who read that Muslims do not support women's rights, $F(1,189) = 4.82$, $p = .03$, $d = 0.32$. Together these findings suggest that beliefs about how much Muslims value gender equality directly affect prejudice and that our manipulation reduced prejudice toward both Muslims and Arabs.

Social Distance

Did the manipulation influence students' desire for social distance? Our analysis indicated that it did, $F(1, 189) = 4.72$, $p = .03$, $d = 0.32$. Students who read that Muslims support women's rights indicated less desire for distance than students who read that Muslims do not support women's rights.

Shared Values

Our manipulation changed students' beliefs about shared values with Muslims, $F(1,189) = 5.47$, $p = .02$, $d = 0.34$. Students who read that Muslims support women's rights reported more shared values than students who read that Muslims do not support women's rights.

Mediation Analysis

Our argument is that one reason people hold prejudice toward Muslims is because they believe Muslims do not value gender equality. If this is true, then increasing people's beliefs that Muslims value gender equality should reduce prejudice, as we found. Next, we explored *why* this might occur by conducting a mediation analysis to see if beliefs about shared values mediate the

reduction in prejudice. We conducted this analysis using Hayes's (2013) PROCESS macro (Model 4), which uses ordinary least squares regression to generate a 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect based on 5,000 bootstrapped samples. We ran separate models for prejudice toward Muslims and social distance with the manipulation coded as 0 = Muslims do not support women's rights, 1 = Muslims support women's rights.

Consistent with our hypothesis, there were significant indirect effects of the manipulation on students' prejudice toward Muslims (indirect effect = -0.18, $SE = 0.09$; 95% CI [-0.38, -0.03]) and the desire to maintain social distance from Muslims (indirect effect = -0.18, $SE = 0.09$; 95% CI [-0.37, -0.03]). Compared with students who read that Muslims do not support women's rights, students who read that Muslims support women's rights were more likely to believe they shared values with Muslims ($b = 0.53$, $p = .02$). In turn, the more students believed they shared values with Muslims, the less likely they were to report prejudice ($b = -0.35$, $p < .001$) or a desire for social distance ($b = -0.34$, $p < .001$). Together, these effects suggest that increasing people's beliefs about how much Muslims value gender equality reduces prejudice and the desire for social distance by increasing beliefs about shared values.

Discussion

Overall, the findings from Study 2 provided experimental support for our hypothesis that people's beliefs about how much Muslims value gender equality are related to prejudice. Increasing Muslims' support for gender equality decreased people's prejudice and desire for social distance. Our mediation analysis suggested that an increase in beliefs about shared values was responsible for these effects. Although the results of Study 2 supported our hypotheses, one limitation of the study is that we did not include a third condition where we omitted information

about how much Muslims value gender equality. The reason we did not include a “no information” condition is because we assumed that in the absence of any information, most people would believe Muslims value gender equality less than other religious groups. This assumption is supported by the results of Study 1 and representative public opinion polls (Pew Research Center, 2006). Nevertheless, without a “no information” control condition we cannot definitively say whether affirming the stereotype that Muslims do not value gender equality increases prejudice or whether refuting the stereotype decreases prejudice. What we can say, however, is that our results show people’s beliefs about Muslims’ support gender equality contribute to prejudice toward Muslims.

General Discussion

There is little doubt that fears of terrorism and intergroup conflict contribute to prejudice toward Muslims, yet we predicted and found support for another, perhaps overlooked source of prejudice: perceived differences in support for gender equality. In Study 1, people believed that Muslims value gender equality less than Christians, and the more that people believed Muslims do not value gender equality the more they reported prejudice toward Muslims. There was little difference between how much people believed that Muslims and Christians value hard work, suggesting that Muslims are not perceived as violating all values to the same extent that they violate the value of gender equality. In Study 2, people reported less prejudice toward Muslims after reading that Muslims support women’s rights than after reading that Muslims do not support women’s rights. Study 2 offered strong support for our hypothesis because increasing how much people believed that Muslims value gender equality decreased prejudice, an effect that occurred by increasing beliefs about shared values.

Theoretical Implications

Our findings have important implications for research on values and prejudice. One implication is broadening our understanding of which values contribute to prejudice. Multiple theories consider egalitarian values to be incompatible with prejudice while individualism and hard work are considered drivers of prejudice (for a review see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Contrary to these theories, recent research suggests that egalitarian values can lead to prejudice toward some groups (Brandt et al., 2014; Chambers et al., 2012). Our studies add to this recent work by demonstrating that people in the U.S. believe Muslims value gender equality less than other religious groups and this belief contributes to prejudice. Our findings support the theory that prejudice occurs when specific groups are stereotyped as violating specific values, regardless of whether those values are traditionally liberal values such as gender equality or traditionally conservative values such as the Protestant work ethic (Biernat & Vescio, 2005).

A second implication of our findings is that they highlight the importance of considering multiple sources of prejudice toward any one group. Whether people perceive Muslims as a symbolic threat to American values or a real threat to the rights of women, this source of prejudice is distinct from the threat of terrorism or competition over resources typically considered causes of prejudice toward Muslims. Hence, our research highlights the complexity of prejudice.

Beyond these implications, our findings raise two interesting questions. First, how broad is the impact of our manipulation? Although the manipulation in Study 2 reduced prejudice toward Muslims, it is worth considering which Muslims our participants were thinking about while providing their responses. The article in Study 2 specifically stated that the poll results

were from a nationally representative sample of religious groups in the U.S. We focused on the U.S. because it seemed unlikely we would convince people that all Muslims support gender equality as much as Christians and Jews, especially given the reality reflected in Pew polls (2010). Thus, while it is possible our participants were only thinking about Muslims in the U.S.—people who might be very different from Muslims in other parts of the world—our manipulation reduced people’s prejudice toward Arabs too, suggesting the effect of the manipulation may extend beyond Muslims in the U.S. However, because our questions did not distinguish between Muslims in the US and Muslims around the world, this remains an open question.

Second, are group differences in support for gender equality more often a source of prejudice or a justification for it? A long history of research on values and prejudice conceptualizes value violations as a cause of prejudice (Allport, 1954; Biernat & Vescio, 2005; Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; Katz & Hass, 1988; Rokeach & Mezei, 1966). However, Crandall and Eshleman (2003) have argued that value violations can be used to justify expressing existing prejudices. According to their Justification-Suppression model, the prejudice people express is the result of competing motives to both suppress and justify negative feelings toward a person or group (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). The tenants of egalitarianism prescribe tolerance which should generally lead people to suppress prejudice against Muslims. Nevertheless, believing that Muslims do not value gender equality, or any other important value might make people feel justified expressing prejudice.

Although value violations may serve as both a cause and a justification for prejudice (see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), is there a way to disentangle whether the perception that Muslims violate the value of gender equality is more often a cause or justification for prejudice against

Muslims? Unfortunately, the current data cannot answer this question and even under ideal circumstances an answer may remain elusive. According to the Justification-Suppression model (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), the psychological processes that lead to the expression of prejudice are recursive, meaning a cause of prejudice may also later be used to justify prejudice. With this limitation in mind, we offer two ideas that might tease apart whether value violations cause or justify prejudice toward Muslims.

First, a longitudinal study may shed light on this question by helping establish temporal precedence. By measuring people's perceptions of value violations and prejudice toward Muslims at multiple points in time, it should be possible to determine whether perceptions of value violations precede prejudice or whether prejudice precedes perceptions of value violations. If people's perceptions of value violations temporally precede prejudice, then it would lend support to the argument that perceived value violations cause prejudice against Muslims.

A second idea is to experimentally increase people's prejudice toward Muslims via a mechanism other than violations of gender equality and then to subsequently measure whether perceptions of value violations go up. If an increase in prejudice for some reason other than gender equality is accompanied by a corresponding increase in the belief that Muslims do not value gender equality, then we believe it would be appropriate to speak of people using perceived value violations as a justification for prejudice against Muslims. It is important to keep in mind, however, that if perceived value violations are used to justify prejudice that does not mean perceived value violations do not also cause prejudice.

Finally, we suggest that the question of whether values cause prejudice or people use values to justify prejudice may, ultimately, have more theoretical than practical significance. If

the causes of and justifications for prejudice both push people in the same direction—toward expressing prejudice—then the question of whether values are a cause or justification, although interesting, may be less important than understanding when values lead people to express prejudice and when they do not.

Practical Implications

What practical implications does our research offer? One that stands out is the potential of reducing prejudice by increasing people's beliefs about shared values with outgroups. Stereotypes of Muslims suggest they do not value gender equality, yet stereotypes obscure millions of Muslims who do value gender equality (Pew Research Center, 2010). Highlighting Muslim activists who advocate for women's rights, like Malala Yousafzai, and providing people with information about countries where a majority of Muslims favor gender equality (Pew Research Center, 2010) might help reduce prejudice if it increases people's beliefs about shared values. Furthermore, providing people with base-rate information about the support for gender equality in Muslim countries like Turkey (89%) and Lebanon (95%) should make it harder for people to dismiss individual activists as exceptions (Pew Research Center, 2010).

Another practical way to decrease prejudice might be to emphasize how Muslims and people in the U.S. share common values other than gender equality. For example, hard work, personal responsibility, and commitment to family are all prominent values in Muslim countries and in the U.S. Pointing out the importance of these shared values could decrease prejudice toward Muslims.

Conclusion

Knowing exactly how much the world's 1.6 billion Muslims value gender equality is

difficult if not impossible. Nevertheless, people in our studies believed that Muslims value gender equality less than Christians and Jews, and this belief was related to prejudice against Muslims. Telling people that Muslims support women's rights reduced this prejudice by increasing beliefs about shared values with Muslims. That people's beliefs about gender equality and shared values influence their feelings toward Muslims highlights the role of values in creating prejudice and underscores the potential of beliefs about shared values to reduce prejudice.

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
Table 1. Mean Beliefs about Support for Gender Equality and Hard Work in Study 1.

	Muslims		Christians	
	<i>M (SD)</i>	95%CI	<i>M (SD)</i>	95%CI
Gender equality	1.55 (1.10)	[1.37, 1.74]	3.25 (1.14)	[3.06, 3.45]
Hard work	4.27 (1.02)	[4.09, 4.44]	4.40 (0.99)	[4.23, 4.57]

Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and 95% Confidence Intervals for Study 2 Variables.


	Condition			
	Support gender equality		Do not support gender equality	
	<i>M (SD)</i>	95%CI	<i>M (SD)</i>	95%CI
Gender equality	4.00 (1.73)	[3.65, 4.35]	2.43 (1.45)	[2.14, 2.73]
Prejudice toward Muslims	1.89 (1.11)	[1.66, 2.11]	2.41 (1.07)	[2.19, 2.63]
Prejudice toward Arabs	2.06 (1.02)	[1.86, 2.27]	2.39 (1.03)	[2.18, 2.60]
Social distance	1.11 (1.14)	[0.88, 1.34]	1.49 (1.23)	[1.23, 1.74]
Shared values	3.82 (1.51)	[3.51, 4.12]	3.28 (1.65)	[2.95, 3.61]

Figure 1. People's beliefs about Muslims' and Christians' support for hard work and gender equality in Study 1.



Note. Error bars represent standard errors.

Figure 2. Students' prejudice toward Muslims and Arabs, desire for social distance, and beliefs about shared values as a function of Muslims' support for gender equality in Study 2.



Note. Error bars represent standard errors.